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The proposition that widespread gun ownership serves as a deterrent to residential burglary is
widely touted by advocates, but the evidence is weak, consisting of anecdotes, interviews with burglars,
casual comparisons with other countries, and the like.  A more systematic exploration requires data on
local rates of gun ownership and of residential burglary, and such data have only recently become
available.  In this paper we exploit a new well-validated proxy for local gun-ownership prevalence – the
proportion of suicides that involve firearms – together with newly available geo-coded data from the
National Crime Victimization Survey, to produce the first systematic estimates of the net effects of gun
prevalence on residential burglary patterns.
The importance of such empirical work stems in part from the fact that theoretical considerations
do not provide much guidance in predicting the net effects of widespread gun ownership.  Guns in the
home may pose a threat to burglars, but also serve as an inducement, since guns are particularly valuable
loot.  Other things equal, a gun-rich community provides more lucrative burglary opportunities than one
where guns are more sparse. The new empirical results reported here provide no support for a net
deterrent effect from widespread gun ownership.  Rather, our analysis concludes that residential burglary
rates tend to increase with community gun prevalence.
Philip J. Cook Jens Ludwig
Sanford Institute for Policy Studies Economic Studies Program
Box 90245 The Brookings Institution
Duke University 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Durham, NC 27708 Washington, DC 20036
and NBER jludwig@brookings.edu
cook@pps.duke.edu1 In addition to its effects on crime, gun ownership may impose other costs on society as
well.  It may increase the suicide rate (Miller and Hemenway 1999; Ludwig and Cook 2000;
Cutler, Glaeser and Norberg 2001; Wintemute et al. 2001; Duggan 2002) and the rate of
unintentional shootings (Miller, Azrael and Hemenway in press).  The relative frequency of
different circumstances for shootings in residences has been documented in Kellermann and
Reay (1986) and Lee et al. (1991).
2For some recent assertions on the deterrent effect in the popular press, see, for example,
Armstrong (2000), Steyn (2000), Witkin (1994), Tucker (1996), and Rowe (2001).
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I. Introduction
Compared with other wealthy nations, the United States has a high rate of civilian
firearms ownership, with 35-40 percent of all households possessing at least one gun (Smith,
2000).  The net effect of widespread gun ownership on the amount and costs of crime remains a
contentious issue because guns have virtuous as well as vicious uses:  the ready availability of
guns may increase gun use by criminal assailants and thereby increase the lethality of assaults
and  robberies (Zimring, 1968, 1972; Cook, 1987, 1991; Zimring and Hawkins 1997; Duggan,
2001);
1 on the other hand, the widespread ownership of guns may increase the likelihood that
victims will be able to defend themselves against attack and even inflict injury on would-be
assailants, which would tend to deter assaults and reduce the likelihood of victim losses in the
event of assault (Kleck 1997; Lott 2000).
The balance between virtuous and vicious uses has traditionally favored keeping a gun at
home over carrying one in public, with the latter subject to more stringent regulation. Guns in the
home do not threaten the public at large in any direct way, and may enhance the capacity for
defending against intruders.  Furthermore, armed households arguably provide a deterrent to
residential burglary, and particularly to “hot” burglaries of occupied dwellings;  if burglars lack
“inside” knowledge about which households are armed, this crime-control benefit is not limited
to those homes that actually have guns ready at hand, but extends to the entire community (Kopel
2001).  Thus there may be a positive externality to keeping a gun at home for self-defense.
While the existence of a burglary-deterrent effect is asserted frequently and with great
confidence by advocates,
2 the empirical support for this assertion is weak.  The available
evidence consists of anecdotes, interviews with burglars, casual comparisons with other
countries, and the like.  A more systematic exploration requires data on local rates of gun
ownership and of residential burglary, and such data have only recently become available.  In this
paper we exploit a new well-validated proxy for local gun-ownership prevalence – the proportion
of suicides that involve firearms – together with newly available geo-coded data from the
National Crime Victimization Survey, to produce the first systematic estimates of the net effects
of gun prevalence on residential burglary patterns.
The importance of such empirical work stems in part from the fact that theoretical3Guns may also be useful inputs into the burglary production process, and may be less
costly for criminals to obtain in areas with high levels of gun ownership.  
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considerations do not provide much guidance in predicting the net effects of widespread gun
ownership.  Guns in the home may pose a threat to burglars, but also serve as an inducement,
since guns are particularly valuable loot (Cook, Molliconi, and Cole 1995).  Other things equal, a
gun-rich community provides more lucrative burglary opportunities than one where guns are
more sparse.
3  The net result for burglary rates and “hot” burglary rates depends in part on the
extent to which burglars can discriminate between occupied and unoccupied homes, and on how
they assess the relevant risk-reward tradeoff.
The new empirical results reported here provide no support for a net deterrent effect from
widespread gun ownership.  Indeed, our analysis concludes that residential burglary rates tend to
increase with community gun prevalence, while the “hot” proportion of these burglaries is
unaffected.  The challenge to establishing a causal interpretation to these results comes from the
possibility that gun ownership may be both cause and effect of local burglary patterns, or that
both variables may be driven by some unmeasured third factor.  While there is no entirely
persuasive way to rule out such competing explanations, our findings are robust to a variety of
empirical approaches.
Our main results come from cross-section regression analysis of National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS) data augmented by a proxy measure of county-level gun
prevalence.  In this analysis we control for a long list of household- and county-level attributes,
and in one specification allow each state to have a different intercept. 
To deal with the potential problem of reverse causation, we replicate our analyses using a
22-year panel of police-reported crime data obtained from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR), finding that lagged gun-ownership rates are positively related to future burglary rates. 
On the other hand lagged burglary rates appear to have a negligible effect on future gun
prevalence, at least in the short run.  Unfortunately the UCR data do not distinguish between
burglaries to occupied versus unoccupied homes, and thus cannot support a separate analysis of
hot burglaries.
The issue of reverse causation is also addressed by use of “instrumental variables” (IV)
estimates.  The specific instrument employed in these estimates is the percentage of the state
population living in rural areas in 1950, an indicator of rural tradition in the state to which gun
ownership is closely tied.  The resulting estimates are compatible with the ordinary-least-squares
estimates in suggesting a non-negative relationship between gun density and burglary rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section offers a brief review
of the existing evidence, with a particular focus on international comparisons.  The data on
burglary and the prevalence of gun ownership are discussed in the third section.  The fourth
presents results on the relationship between gun prevalence and burglary rates.  We develop a-5-
simple model demonstrating that the theoretical relationship between guns and burglary is
indeterminate, and then present new empirical results on this relationship.   The fifth section
examines the relationship between guns and hot burglary rates, and the final section concludes.
II. Review of the Existing Evidence
The evidence typically cited in discussions of how gun prevalence affects residential
burglary rates is of five types.  First, data on the frequency of gun use by householders against
intruders are cited to support the plausibility of a deterrence hypothesis.  Second, interviews with
burglars or former burglars provide more direct evidence on the deterrent effect, and also on the
inducement to burglary of guns in the home.  Third, international comparisons are offered,
usually comparing the percentage of residential burglaries that are “hot” in the United States with
one or more other countries that have lower gun prevalence.  Fourth, anecdotes (sometimes
supported with data) are recounted about how burglary rates were affected by interventions
intended to change household gun prevalence.  Finally, there have been two systematic studies,
including regression analyses of panel data, on the effect of gun prevalence on overall (residential
plus non-residential) burglary rates (Lott 2000; Duggan 2001).
A. Frequency of gun use in self-defense
The frequency with which guns are used in defense against burglary has been estimated
from survey data from time to time.  Unfortunately the estimates differ by an order of magnitude,
depending on how the survey is conducted and what questions are asked.
At the high end is a 1994 random-digit-dial telephone survey that generated an estimate
of 503,000 instances in the preceding 12 months in which some member of the household
retrieved a gun to fend off an intruder who was actually seen (Ikeda et al. 1997).  The survey was
conducted by a private firm, DataStat, on behalf of the federal government.  It completed 5,238
interviews, of which 22 respondents reported one or more uses of a gun in the event of an
intruder; 5 of these accounted for nearly half of all the reported instances.  Almost all of these
reports (98.9 %) indicated that the intruder had been scared off.
At the low end are estimates based on the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS),
which is conducted every six months by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The NCVS includes
respondents from a sample of about 50,000 households, the members of which are usually
interviewed in person; the design of this survey represents best practice in the area.  Based on a
special tabulation of NCVS data by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Cook (1991, p. 56) estimated
that there were an annual average of just 32,000 instances per year for the period 1979-87 in
which a householder used a gun against someone who broke into the home or attempted to do so.
Is the “right” answer 32,000 or 503,000?  There is no obvious way to reconcile these two
estimates.  The same puzzle has arisen in survey-based estimates of self-defense uses of guns in
other circumstances (Kleck and Gertz 1995; Smith 1997), which also differ by an order of
magnitude, and that discussion will not be reviewed here.  Suffice it to say that survey-based4A study of home-invasion burglaries (unwanted entry of a single-family home while one
or more individuals were present in the home) in Atlanta based on 198 police reports during
summer 1994 found that just 1.5% of victims used a gun in self-defense (Kellermann et al.,
1995).
5On the other hand, a burglar interviewed by Rengert and Wasilchick (1985) said that he
shunned burglaries in neighborhoods in which the residents were of a different race because
“You’ll get shot if you’re caught there (p. 62).”
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estimates for rare and normatively charged events such as gun self-defense are highly sensitive to
survey method, and that we are inclined to place somewhat more faith in the NCVS results for
reasons explained in our earlier work (Cook, Ludwig and Hemenway 1997).
Cook (1991) estimated that there were about 1.0 million burglaries each year of occupied
residences during the period 1979-87.  The NCVS estimate then implies that in one in every 30
such burglaries was a gun used in self-defense.  The DataStat estimate suggests that fully half of
such burglaries resulted in self-defense with a gun.   The credibility of the “deterrence” claim
depends in part on which of these two estimates is closer to the truth.
4
B.  Interviews with Burglars
 Evidence directly relevant for judging the “deterrence” and “inducement” hypotheses
comes from surveys of felons.  For example, in one 1982 convenience sample of 1,823 state
prisoners, 35 percent of respondents “strongly agreed” and 39 percent “agreed” that “one reason
burglars avoid houses when people are at home is that they fear being shot.”  Of the respondents
who used a gun to commit the crime for which they were incarcerated, 50 percent reported that
the possibility of encountering an armed victim was “very important” in their decision to employ
a gun, while another 12 percent reported that this motivation was “somewhat important” (Wright
and Rossi 1994).
At the same time guns are of considerable value to burglars, who typically prefer items
that are easy to carry, easily concealed, and have high “pound for pound value” (Shover, 1991,
Wright and Decker, 1994).  As one St. Louis burglar reported, “A gun is money with a trigger”
(Wright and Decker, 1994).  Another respondent in the same study expressed a preference for
working in neighborhoods with high proportions of white residents since households in these
areas are likely to have “the basics,” include guns:  “White people hunt a lot more so than
blacks” (Wright and Decker, 1994, p. 90).
5
Nearly half of the respondents to the prison survey mentioned above report that they have
stolen a gun during their lifetimes; of this group, seventy percent usually steal guns to sell or6 The prevalence of gun theft in the Wright and Rossi (1982) convenience sample of
prisoners is higher than in the nationally representative sample of prisoners interviewed as part of
the 1991 Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities, in which only 10 percent of
respondents report ever having stolen a gun.
7One attempt to generate internationally comparable survey-based results is the United
Nations-sponsored International Crime Survey.  This survey includes the United States, but is far
smaller and in other ways inferior to the NCVS.  More to the point, it does not include items that
would permit the estimate of a hot burglary rate.  For more details see ict-
law.leidenuniv.nl/group/jfcr/www/icvs/Index.htm.
8 Our best guess is that at least 7% and perhaps as many as 46% of the cases coded as
“respondent home but unaware of burglary” in the BCS -- and thus counted as “hot” -- would be
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trade rather than to keep for themselves (Wright and Rossi 1994).
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C.  International Comparisons
Since the prevalence of household gun possession is substantially higher in the United
States than Canada, Britain, and other wealthy nations, it seems reasonable to test the
“deterrence” hypothesis by comparing residential burglary rates and patterns across these nations. 
As it turns out, relevant data are hard to come by.  The Uniform Crime Reports do not provide a
basis for estimating the number of “hot” burglaries, nor do the police-recorded data systems of
other countries.  Relevant survey-based estimates can be generated for the U.S. from the NCVS,
but no other country has an annual crime survey of comparable quality.
7   There have been
occasional crime surveys in other nations, which suggest that other countries tend to have a
higher percentage of residential burglaries involving occupied dwellings than for the United
States.  Table 1 (top panel) lists some of the relevant estimates that have been reported by Kleck
(1997) and Kopel (2001).
One obvious problem with these comparisons is that the hot burglary rate for each
country or city is measured at a different point in time.  For two countries – the United States and
Great Britain – survey measures of hot burglary rates are available for a common year, 1998. 
When we standardize for period effects in this way, the difference across the two countries in the
hot burglary rate is reduced from the factor of 4 or 5 to 1 reported by Kleck and Kopel (top panel)
to a factor of about 2 to 1 (bottom panel).
But comparability problems remain.  The bottom panel of Table 1 highlights one
difference.  In 28 percent of American burglaries NCVS respondents did not know their
whereabouts at the time of the burglary, a category that is not included in the British Crime
Survey (BCS).  Judging from the open-ended narratives provided by BCS burglary victims, a
number of cases in which the respondent apparently did not know whether anyone was at home
at the time of the burglary are classified as “respondent home, unaware of the burglary.”
8  Ascoded as “victim location unknown” in the NCVS and counted as “cold” burglaries.  This
inference stems from the fact that many of the respondents in this BCS category discover
evidence of the burglary only after the fact, in the form of damage or other signs of forcible entry. 
Examples of such cases include the BCS respondent who reported that “there was evidence on
the patio door that a tool had been used to try to open it; the marks were noticed in April, we
don’t know when they tried to break in,” and another who reported that “someone came into my
flat, probably while I was asleep after my dinner, and stole a metal case.”  Cases in which the
respondent simply reports finding evidence of an attempted break-in, but does not elaborate on
his or her uncertainty about when the crime occurred or where he or she was at the time, are far
more common.
9On the other hand differences in survey methods or reporting across countries could also
in principle mask even larger differences in hot burglary rates than those reported in Table 1. 
The ratio of completed to attempted burglaries is far higher in the U.S. (3 or 4 to 1) than in the
U.K. (nearly equal in most years) (Perkins et al., 1996, Home Office, 1999).  One possible
explanation for the relative scarcity of burglary attempts in the American NCVS data is that
Americans are less likely then the English to report burglary attempts to interviewers.  In this
case, the denominator for the NCVS-based “hot burglary” calculations are too low, which could
lead us to either over- or under-state the hot burglary rate in the U.S. depending on what fraction
of the unreported burglary attempts are to occupied homes.
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seen in the last row of Table 1, adjusting for this coding discrepancy between the BCS and
NCVS lowers the hot burglary rate in the UK from 46% to between 36% and 45%.
9
More importantly, even if we had comparable data there would remain the fact that a
variety of potential explanations are plausible for an observed difference in the percentage of
residential burglaries that involve occupied dwellings.  For example, when burglars are arrested
the punishment is more certain and severe in the U.S. than in England and Wales (Table 2).  The
difference in penalties provides an alternative explanation for why American burglars take extra
care to avoid contact with victims.  American and British households differ in a variety of other
ways as well that are likely to affect the cost-benefit calculus facing burglars, including
substantial differences in the proportion of households that have dogs or lack men.  Without
controlling for the other differences that may be important, attributing the disparity in hot
burglary rates to one particular difference – gun prevalence – is entirely unpersuasive.
D.  Case Studies
A variety of anecdotes have been offered in support of the deterrence hypothesis (Kopel
2001), but few have been well documented.  The case of Kennesaw, Georgia, which adopted a
ordinance in 1982 requiring every household to keep a gun, has been particularly prominent. 
There have been several published analyses of the burglary trend in Kennesaw around the time of
the ordinance, with contradictory results (Kleck 1991, pp. 136-38; McDowall, Lizotte, and
Wiersema 1991; Kleck 1998).  In any event, this is not a good test of the deterrence hypothesis,-9-
since the ordinance in question was purely symbolic.  Most homes in Kennesaw already had a
gun prior to the ordinance, and it seems unlikely that the ordinance had an effect on prevalence
since there was no penalty specified in the law for refusal to comply.
E. Regression Analysis of Panel Data
Two previous studies have examined the relationship between gun ownership and overall
burglary rates within the U.S.  Both studies rely on UCR data that lump together residential and
non-residential burglary, and do not allow hot burglaries to be identified separately.  These
studies yield conflicting results about the relationship between gun prevalence and burglary rates.
Lott (2000) analyzes state-level UCR data for two years -- 1988 and 1996 -- and finds that
after controlling for region and period effects as well as a variety of state co-variates, a one
percentage point increase in gun-ownership rates reduces burglary rates by 1.6 percentage points. 
One problem with this analysis is Lott’s choice of data to measure state gun ownership rates.  He
employs two voter-exit surveys that, among other problems, are not comparable with each other,
as suggested by the fact that the individual gun-ownership rate is 10 percentage points higher in
the 1996 survey than the 1988 survey, 37 percent versus 27 percent (Lott 2000, p. 36).  In
contrast, estimates from the General Social Survey, which has included items on guns since 1972
and is widely regarded as the best ongoing source of data on this topic, indicate that gun-
ownership rates were actually declining slightly during this time period (Smith 2000).
Duggan (2001) uses a different measure for local gun prevalence – subscription rates to
Guns & Ammo Magazine.  While Lott relies on state-level UCR data measured at just two points
in time, Duggan uses county- and state-level UCR data for the period 1980-1998, which enables
him to control for county or state fixed effects as well as other co-variates.  Duggan’s state-level
analysis finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between changes in gun
ownership rates and UCR burglary rates two years in the future, while the regression coefficient
on the one-year lag of the change in gun prevalence is negligible.
III. Measuring Crime Rates and Gun Prevalence
Direct measures of burglary rates are available from two independent sources, the
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which are tabulations of crime reported to and recorded by the
police and then forwarded to the FBI, and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). 
For measuring gun ownership rates at the local level we rely on a well-validated proxy measure,
the proportion of suicides that involve firearms.
A. Uniform Crime Reports
The FBI’s UCR system compiles records each year from law enforcement agencies across
the country for crimes known to the police.  While the UCR is the only source for measuring
annual crime rates for sub-national jurisdictions such as states or counties, these data have a
number of problems.  First, only a fraction of serious crimes are reported to the police, and the-10-
probability that victims do report crimes appears to be systematically related to factors such as
socio-economic status, urbanicity and local police resources (Laub, 1981, Levitt, 1998a). 
Second, some law enforcement agencies do not report complete crime information to the FBI in
some years.  The FBI attempts to fill in missing data by an imputation procedure which of course
introduces another sort of error.  Third, the published data on UCR burglary rates lump together
residential and non-residential burglaries.  While local jurisdictions are supposed to report a
breakdown of burglary counts by the type of victim (residential or non-residential) and these data
are available from the UCR in unpublished form, in practice the quality control on these data
appears weaker than for the overall burglary counts.  Nationwide, non-residential burglaries
make up one-third of the total reported in the UCR (FBI 1996, p. 39).
The UCR data do not distinguish between burglaries of occupied and unoccupied
buildings.  In fact, some of the “hot” burglaries will not even be included in the UCR burglary
count, since incidents are classified by the most serious of the crimes recorded by the police.  If
the police record that the perpetrator robbed the occupant after breaking into the dwelling, for
example, then the entire incident is recorded as a robbery rather than a burglary.  
Our calculations draw on UCR data for the period 1977 through 1998, measured at both
the state and county levels.  The advantage of using county-level data is that we are able to
account for some sources of within-state heterogeneity.  The disadvantage of the county data is
that they appear to be far more sensitive to problems with the imputation methods used to correct
for missing data (Maltz, 1999), and information on the local-area socio-demographic
characteristics that may be relevant in explaining burglary rates are less readily available at the
county than state level.
B. National Crime Victimization Survey
Since 1973 the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) has provided analysts with
a rich source of information on certain household and personal crimes.  Conducted by the Census
Bureau for the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the NCVS collects victimization reports from
residents drawn from a sample of 50,000 to 60,000 housing units.  Households are selected to
participate using a multi-stage sampling procedure in which the probability of selection depends
in part on the size of the respondent’s county as well as other factors; sampling weights are
provided with the NCVS to generate nationally representative estimates, which are used in all of
the analysis that follows.  Housing units selected for NCVS are interviewed initially in person,
and then re-interviewed six more times at six-month intervals either in person or on the
telephone.  Surveys are conducted with every household resident who is 12 years of age or older,
yielding a total of 90,000 to 100,000 survey responses.  Response rates with the NCVS are
typically on the order of 95 percent (Perkins et al., 1996).
Our analysis relies on a special restricted-use version of the NCVS that identifies the
county in which survey respondents reside.  This geo-coding enables us to merge information
from the NCVS with a measure of gun prevalence in the respondent’s county, as described in the10 While geo-coded NCVS data are now available through restricted-use Census data
centers for 1987 through 1998, our own analyses rely on data for the period 1994-1998.  Even
with the full 1987-98 sample, however, there is unlikely to be enough over-time variation in gun
ownership rates to support a fixed-effects analysis, since (as we discuss below) there is only
modest over-time variation even for the 1977-1998 period.
11 We also exclude from our analytic sample counties that have fewer than 50 suicides
during the 1987-1996 period, although this constraint excludes relatively few additional counties. 
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next section.  Given the limited number of years for which geo-coded NCVS data are available,
10
we pool these data and focus our attention on cross-sectional analyses with the NCVS.
C. Household Gun Prevalence
Since the United States does not maintain a registry of guns in private hands, survey data
are the primary means of generating national and regional estimates for gun ownership rates and
patterns.  According to the 1999 General Social Survey, 36% of households own at least one
firearm (Smith 2000, p. 52).  Unfortunately neither the General Social Survey nor any other
provides reliable estimates for each of the 50 states or for local jurisdictions.  Hence, exploring
the effect of gun prevalence at the sub-regional level requires use of a proxy variable.
Recent research demonstrates that among the readily computed proxies that have been
used for this purpose, one has the greatest validity: the percentage of suicides committed with a
gun.   This proxy “outperforms” such measures as the percentage of homicides committed with a
gun, the prevalence of membership in the National Rifle Association, or the subscription rates for
gun-oriented magazines (Azrael, Cook and Miller 2001).  As an example, the cross-section
correlation between this proxy and survey-based estimates available for 21 states (from the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System) is .90; the corresponding correlation for the
subscription rate to Guns & Ammo is .67, and to the NRA membership prevalence is .55.
Table 3 highlights the substantial variation in gun ownership across states within the U.S. 
Since suicide is a fairly rare event, in Table 3 and our other cross-sectional analyses we improve
the reliability of our proxy measure by combining suicide data for the period 1987 through 1996.
This measure ranges from near 30 percent in Hawaii and Massachusetts to over 75 percent in
Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi.  While these examples highlight the substantial regional
differences in gun ownership rates (Cook and Ludwig 1996; Glaeser and Glendon 1998), there is
also considerable intra-regional variation.  For example the proportion of suicides involving guns
equaled 67 percent in Vermont, but only 57 percent in nearby New Hampshire and 31 percent in
Massachusetts.  In Illinois, guns were involved in 47 percent of suicides, compared with 55 and
63 percent in Wisconsin and Indiana, respectively.  As demonstrated below there is also
substantial within-state variation among counties, even when the sample is limited to the set of
large counties (with populations of 100,000 or more) for which Vital Statistics reports separate
county-level mortality information.
1112 Gun prices may also be relevant, in two opposing respects.  First, as Mark Kleiman has
pointed out to us, black-market gun prices may be inversely related to G, which if true would
weaken the argument that the expected loot increases with gun prevalence.  By the same
reasoning, it will be cheaper for burglars to arm themselves in cities with high gun prevalence, a
fact that may be relevant to the extent that gun possession makes a burglar bolder.  See Cook
(1976, 1991) for a similar argument with respect to robbery.
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Our ability to exploit standard panel-data techniques to control for confounding factors
and reverse-causation is limited somewhat by the fact that the cross-section structure of gun
ownership is quite stable over time.  For example, in our state panel data for 1977-1998 fully 90
percent of the variation in gun ownership rates is cross-sectional.  But as reported below, the
inter-temporal variation is sufficient to generate reliable results. 
IV. Gun Prevalence and Burglary Rates
Our empirical strategy is to explore the effect of gun prevalence on burglary rates, and
then, in the next section, turn to the specific matter of hot burglary.  We begin by developing a
simple model which demonstrates that the net effect of gun prevalence on residential burglary
rates may be positive or negative, depending on the relative magnitude of the deterrence effect
and what we are calling the “inducement” effect.  We then estimate this relationship using data
from the UCR and NCVS.
A.  Model 
The opposing effects of gun prevalence on residential burglary rates are highlighted by
considering a simple  model of the expected utility of a single burglary opportunity, as in
equation (1).  Let G represent the proportion of households in the community that possess guns,
where P is the probability that the burglar encounters an armed household resident and is shot, D
is the utility associated with being shot (which we assume is independent of wealth) and L is the
expected loot associated with committing a successful burglary.  To further simplify the model,
we assume that the burglar is risk neutral with respect to wealth, and is endowed with wealth W.
(1) E [U[G] ] = P[G]×D + (1 - P[G])×(L[G]+W)
The probability of being shot (P) is an upward-sloping function of G.  The loot associated with
successful burglaries (L) is a function of G with LN>0 because guns present an attractive target
for theft.
12
An increase in gun prevalence will increase the utility of this burglary prospect if the
additional utility from increased loot outweighs the increased probability of suffering a loss in
utility from being shot, as in (2).  If burglars are able to determine which homes are occupied,
reducing P for a given level of G, then the inducement effect becomes more important compared
to the deterrent effect.  In the extreme case in which burglars are always able to avoid occupied13 Because of problems with the crime data reported by law enforcement authorities to the
UCR system (Maltz, 1999), our analytic sample excludes observations from Illinois, 1993-1998,
Kansas, 1993-1998, Kentucky, 1996-1998, and New Hampshire, 1997.
14As it turns out, estimating equation (3) using single-year observations for each state
rather than 3-year averages yields point estimates that are similar to those in Table 4 but with
larger standard errors.  
15The last observations in the series are for the 4-year period, 1995-1998.
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homes (that is, P=0), more guns unambiguously increase the net gains to burglary.
(2) (1-P)LN > PN(L+W-D)
This result can be translated into a corresponding prediction about the burglary rate on the
assumption that one such prospect is available to each potential burglar during each period.  (The
only complication has to do with the logical possibility that a burglar who is shot will drop out in
subsequent periods.)
The model serves to demonstrate the possibility that more guns will result in more or
fewer burglaries.  Empirical work may help resolve this ambiguity.
B.  UCR Results
We begin our empirical exploration using data from the Uniform Crime Reports, which
are available for each year since 1977 and form the basis of earlier analyses on the same topic by
Lott (2000) and Duggan (2001).
13  Standard panel-data techniques yield a positive estimated
relationship between changes in gun prevalence and changes in burglary rates.  In an effort to
deal with the possibility of omitted-variables bias, a set of estimates utilizing an instrumental
variable for gun prevalence is also presented, with qualitatively similar findings.
1. Panel Data Results
The baseline model is described in equation (3), which we estimate using state-level UCR
data.  The key outcome measure of interest, )Bit, equals the change in state i’s burglary rate
between period t-1 and t.  The key explanatory variable of interest is the change in the state’s gun
index, )Git-1, which is lagged one period to minimize the problem of reverse causation; this
problem arises because burglary rates may be the cause as well as the effect of gun prevalence if
the demand for guns is influenced by a concern for defending against intruders.  To reduce the
measurement error associated with  the gun proxy, each observation in our panel corresponds to a
state rather than a county, and to a 3-year rather than the more usual single-year period.
14  Thus
for the period 1977-1998 each state contributes seven observations to the panel.
15  To control for
possibly confounding factors the model conditions on a vector of state socio-demographic16 The average burglary rate for the 1977-1998 period was 1,276 per 100,000, while the
average value for our gun prevalence proxy equaled 58 and the average gun ownership rate in the
US equaled around 40 percent.  The discrepancy in elasticity estimates occurs because the gun
proxy increases one-for-one with actual household gun ownership rates (Azrael, Cook and
Miller, 2001), while the national average for the former is far higher than for the latter (58 versus
40 percent).  Thus a 40 point increase in the proportion of suicides that involve guns represents
around a 70 percent increase with respect to our gun proxy but a 100 percent increase in actual
household gun ownership rates.
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characteristics Xit including per capita income, racial composition, prisoners per capita, the
poverty rate, and alcohol consumption.
(3) )Bit = $0 + $1 )Git-1 + $2 )Xit + (i + *t + <it
 Since the outcome variable is measured in change rather than level form, the time-
invariant inter-state structure of burglary rates drops out.  The model also includes state fixed
effects ((i) to control for unmeasured factors that may change over time and drive state-specific
trends in burglary rates, and period effects (*t) to adjust for nation-wide changes over time in
burglary trends.  Because a given change in gun prevalence may have a larger effect on burglary
rates in areas where those rates are high, we also estimate a constant-proportional-effect version
of equation (3) that uses the natural logarithm of the burglary rate as the outcome measure.  To
further control for time-varying unmeasured state attributes that may bias our findings, we re-
estimate equation (3) in a variety of alternative forms including models that condition on  lagged
changes in burglary rates, state-specific linear trends, and region-period interactions, as well as a
version that controls for serial correlation by allowing the error structure in (3) to follow an auto-
regressive process that is unique to each state.
The UCR-based results are consistent in demonstrating that gun prevalence has a positive
association with burglary.  Table 4 summarizes the results for the coefficient and standard-error
estimates on the gun-prevalence variable in our models.  (Since the additional co-variates
generally have the expected effect we do not focus on them in our discussion; the full set of
coefficient estimates for the “base” model are relegated to the appendix, Table A1).
The base model includes state and year fixed effects and several co-variates.  The
estimated coefficients (reported in the first line of Table 4) are positive and statistically
significant in both the linear and semi-log specifications, and imply an elasticity of burglary with
respect to the gun-prevalence proxy on the order of +0.67.  The elasticity of burglaries with
respect to gun ownership is slightly lower (around +0.4 or +0.5) because the proxy measure,
while linearly related to gun prevalence over the relevant range, is not proportional (Azrael, Cook
and Miller, 2001).
16  For simplicity, and to facilitate comparisons with previous research, we
focus in what follows on the elasticity of the burglary rate with respect to our gun proxy measure.
These findings are fairly robust to changes in how the model is estimated.  Subsequent-15-
lines of Table 4 report the results of conditioning on the lagged value of the dependent variable, 
including linear state-specific trends or region-period interaction terms in the model, or
accounting for serial correlation in the error structure.  Several of these changes reduce the
magnitude of the coefficient on the gun proxy somewhat from the base model, but do not
qualitatively change the findings.  Using a model specification similar to that employed by
Duggan (2001), in which the log burglary rate is regressed against the lagged and twice-lagged
values of the log burglary and gun ownership variables, yields qualitatively similar findings
(Table A1).
In part because the gun-prevalence variable is lagged in these regressions, it seems
unlikely that the results reflect the reverse-causal effect of burglary rates on the demand for gun
ownership.  To further explore this possibility, we regress gun prevalence on the lagged burglary
rate; that is, equation (3) is re-estimated with B and G interchanged.  In this set up the coefficient
estimate for the lagged burglary rate ()Bi,t-1)is typically quite close to zero.  Only when region-
period interaction terms are included in the model does the burglary coefficient become
statistically significant, and even then the implied elasticity is on the order of +0.06 or +0.07, far
smaller than the estimated effect of the lagged gun proxy on burglary rates.  Thus it appears that
gun prevalence drives burglary but burglary does not drive gun prevalence.
2. Instrumental Variables Estimates
Another way to address the endogeneity issue is by finding an instrument for gun
prevalence that is not plausibly correlated with the error term in the burglary regression.  The
ideal instrument must pass three tests:  highly correlated with gun prevalence,  not affected by the
current burglary rate, and uncorrelated with any influential omitted variables.  The instrument
that we use here exploits the fact that the cross-section structure of gun ownership rates has been
highly stable over time, and is driven in large part by each area’s local rural tradition (Azrael,
Cook and Miller 2001).  The instrument is the fraction of a state’s population that lived in a rural
area in 1950.  It passes the first two tests: It is highly predictive of each state’s gun ownership
rate in the 1980's or 1990's, and is presumably not influenced by burglary rates occurring many
years later.  We have less confidence in how it does by the third test; “rural tradition” in a state
may be correlated with other factors that influence burglary rates, not all of which are necessarily
captured by the co-variates in our specification (which in this case include a measure of current
urbanicity).   Subject to that warning, we find that gun prevalence, as instrumented, tends to have
a positive association with burglary rates.  
The “instrumental variables” estimates come from estimating equations (4) and (5) using
two-stage least squares.  Because our instrument is defined by a single year’s data (1950), we are
limited to a cross-sectional analysis of burglary.  In the equations Gi represents state (i)’s gun
ownership rate for the period 1987-1996, Bi represents the state’s average burglary rate over the
period 1993 to 1995, Xi represents the average value of the state-level co-variates described
above for the 1993-95 period (including a measure of the fraction of the state’s population
currently living in a metropolitan statistical area), and Ri represents the fraction of state (i)’s
population that lived in rural areas in 1950.  The first-stage equation (4) yields a predicted value17 We also experimented with a variety of other instrumental variables although with little
success.  The proportion of households headed by a female has mixed predictive power in first-
stage equations. Since the second-stage point estimates are typically negative, equally consistent
with either a net deterrent effect or the omitted variables bias that is likely to be in the direction
of the deterrent effect, these results are not very informative.  A variety of state sales and excise
tax variables often had first-stage explanatory power, but failed standard over-identification tests.
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for each state’s gun ownership rate, which is then substituted for the actual gun proxy in the
second-stage equation (5). 
(4) Gi = "0 + "1 Ri + "2 Xi + vi
   
(5) Bi = 20 +  21 ^Gi + 22 Xi + ei 
Table 5 shows that the instrument R has a very strong relationship with cross-sectional
variation in gun ownership rates.  Using state-level cross-section data (top panel, Table 5) the F-
statistic for the significance of the instrument in the first-stage equation is equal to 20 (p<.01),
while the partial R-squared is equal to 0.03.  As seen in the bottom panel of Table 5, the
instrument has similarly strong predictive power when gun-ownership levels are measured at the
county level (with standard errors adjusted for the fact that the instrument varies at the state
rather than county level).
The second stage estimates (Table 5) are positive, and thus consistent with a net
inducement effect for both the state and county data.  While the point estimates are not
statistically significant, the implied elasticities of burglary with respect to gun ownership are
equal to +0.46 and +0.41, respectively, consistent with the panel-data results shown in Table 4. 
Estimating the instrumental variables model using a different three-year cross-section from the
mid-1980's through the late 1990's yields qualitatively similar results to those shown in Table 5:
the estimated effects of guns on burglary rates are positive or close to zero.
In interpreting the instrumental-variables estimates in Table 5 reverse causation can be
ruled out, but there remains the possibility that the influence on current burglary rates of “% rural
in 1950" is not only through gun prevalence but also through some other mechanism not
otherwise accounted for.  Any bias that results from this problem is likely to exaggerate the
deterrent effect of gun prevalence, because rural areas have on average lower burglary rates and
higher gun ownership rates than urban areas even after conditioning on a variety of local-area
characteristics. (See Appendix B for a formalization of this argument.)  Because our IV strategy
arguably overstates the deterrent effect of gun prevalence yet still yields estimates suggesting a
net inducement effect, more guns seem more likely to lead to more than fewer burglaries.
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C. NCVS Results 
The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) provides an alternative source of data18 The choice of a linear-probability approach may be questioned: standard practice when
there is a binary dependent variable is to estimate a non-linear form, such as a probit or logit.   As
a test, we ran a probit regression of the basic burglary specification. The qualitative results were
unchanged from the linear-probability model.
19The purpose for including state fixed effects was to control for regional culture and the
relevant characteristics of the state criminal-justice system.
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on residential burglary that is superior to the UCR data in a number of ways, as discussed above
(section IIIA).  The UCR, unlike the NCVS, lump together residential burglaries with
commercial burglaries, only include crimes that happen to be reported to the police, and classify
some incidents that included a burglary as robberies or assaults.  Further they are only available
at an aggregate level.   The geo-coded version of the NCVS data allow a fine-grained analysis of
geographic patterns in residential burglary.   However, since we only have access to these data in
geo-coded form for the period 1994-98, we cannot reproduce the analysis of intertemporal
patterns reported in the previous section.
1.  The Probability of Burglary Victimization
Table 6 reports the results of a cross-section regression analysis using almost 330,000
household survey responses taken from the 1994 through 1998 twice-annual waves of the NCVS. 
Only households in counties of population 100,000 or more are included. The dependent variable
in each case is a 0-1 indicator of whether or not the household reported being victimized by at
least one illegal break-in or attempt during the preceding six months.  The average for this
variable is 2 percent.  Variable definitions and means are in the appendix, Table A2.
The coefficients and standard errors are least-squares estimates, and are to be interpreted
as the change in probability of burglary (in percentage terms) resulting from a one-unit increase
in the independent variable. All our estimates are calculated using the survey’s sampling weights,
and Huber-White standard errors are calculated to adjust for the clustering of NCVS observations
within counties.
18 
 Each regression controls for a variety of household characteristics, chosen in part on the
basis of previous research (Smith and Jarjoura, 1989; Shover, 1991; Wright and Decker 1994). 
The three models differ with respect to the inclusion of other controls; Model 2 includes five
county-level descriptors, while Model 3 includes a complete set of state fixed effects.
19  As it
turns out, most of the coefficient estimates on household characteristics are similar across the
three models.  Before commenting on the gun-prevalence estimates, we offer a few observations
on the results for these household characteristics, which are not without interest in their own
right.
The co-variates can be classified as either socio-economic-status (SES) variables, or as
variables that characterize the vulnerability of the household to burglary.  The results for the SES20We also experimented with controlling for two county-level crime rates, motor-vehicle
theft and larceny, either by themselves or in conjunction with the other county-level variables. 
These crime rates may be indicative of the supply of criminals in the county and of the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system.  Their inclusion had little effect on other results, and
are not reported here.
-18-
variables are quite consistent: burglary risk falls as education, age, or income increases. It is
lower for households headed by a married couple rather than an unmarried adult, and is lower if
the head is employed.  Renter units are more likely to be burglarized than owner-occupied
residences.  Even accounting for those characteristics, blacks are more likely to be burglarized
than whites or other ethnic groups. 
The results for the variables that characterize vulnerability are also quite sensible. 
Households are more likely to be burglarized if living in an apartment building rather than free-
standing residences; if located in the city rather than in the suburbs and rural areas of these
(predominantly urban) counties; if the head is away from home most every night; and if it is new
to the neighborhood, having moved in within the last two years.  A bit mysterious is the finding
that having children at home increases the risk of burglary victimization.  
It is also of interest to note the estimated effects of county-population characteristics. 
These might be expected to influence the effectiveness of law enforcement, as well as the supply
of criminals.  As it turns out, racial composition, poverty, and female labor-force participation
have little apparent effect on the likelihood of burglary victimization.  Population density has a
negative effect.
20  
The key explanatory variable of interest in these models is the proxy for gun-ownership
prevalence, the proportion of suicides in the respondent’s county that involved firearms during
the 10 year period from 1987 through 1996.  As seen in Table 6, the findings with respect to this
variable are strong, and consistent with the findings from the UCR data.  The probability of
burglary victimization increases with gun prevalence in the county.  In particular, an increase of
10 percentage points (from, say, 50 to 60) in the gun-prevalence indicator is associated with an
increase in the probability of being burglarized by about 0.12 percent, for example from 1.80% to
1.92%.  These results imply an elasticity of burglary with respect to the gun proxy equal to .36 at
the mean value of 54.
Our preferred explanation for why higher gun prevalence would engender a higher
burglary rate is in terms of the monetary payoff to burglary – guns are valuable loot because they
are portable and are readily sold or fenced.  The plausibility of this explanation is supported by
an analysis of the likelihood that one or more guns is stolen in a burglary.  Table 7 reports the
results of a regression analysis of the 1994-1998 NCVS data.  There are two sets of results.  The
first column reports the results of regressions on the entire sample where the dependent variable
is a 0-1 indicator of whether the household reported a gun stolen during the previous six months
in a burglary.  The second column reports results of regressions on the sub-sample of cases in21Data on successful burglaries in Prince Georges County, Maryland, were provided by
the police for the years 1998-2000.  There were 10,592 reported to the police during that time, of
which 4.2% had at least one gun stolen.  On average 1.8 guns were stolen, valued at an average
of $327.
22Our estimate is based on the 4,809 burglary cases reported by respondents to the NCVS
between 1994 and 1998 in which something was stolen.  While the NCVS does not provide
information on the value of the stolen guns, it does provide information on the total value of all
items that were stolen as well as the types of goods that were stolen.  The value of the stolen guns
to the victim is inferred by regressing the total value of what was stolen against indicators for the
types of items that were taken.  The regression also controls for household income, whether the
home is owner-occupied, and the household head’s educational attainment.   The coefficient on
the dummy variable indicating that guns were part of the loot equals $1,384.  That may be biased
if burglaries in which guns are stolen tend to involve households with greater portable wealth in
ways that are not fully reflected in the co-variates.
23In another 6 percent of cases in which guns were part of the loot, the only other item
taken was cash.
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which there was a burglary.  Each row of the table corresponds to a different specification of the
regression, the same array as reported in greater detail in Table 6.  In every case the coefficient is
positive and significantly different from zero, indicating the unsurprising result that higher gun
prevalence is associated with more guns being stolen.  
It should be noted, however, that the implied effect of gun prevalence on the overall
profitability of residential burglary is not great.  The likelihood of a gun being stolen in a
successful residential burglary included in this sample is just 5.1% overall; an increase of 10
points in the gun-prevalence proxy would increase the probability of guns being part of the loot
by one percentage point.  On the basis of data from a special study of burglaries in Prince
Georges County, we estimate that the expected market value of this “prize” of about $30.
21 
NCVS data for 1994-1998 suggest a somewhat higher value, perhaps as high as $70 – equal to
about 5% of the mean burglary ($1,505) and 20% of the median ($330).
22  The actual value to the
burglar depends on the local black market.  In most cities the value would be less than in the licit
market (Cook, Molliconi and Cole 1995).  
This sort of expected-value calculation presumes that burglars encounter guns by chance. 
But in some burglaries the burglar has knowledge of the household and its possessions because
he is a neighbor or ex-spouse or friend.  In any event, it seems relevant that in 14 percent of the
NCVS cases in which a gun was stolen, it was the only item stolen.
23 24Thanks to Bruce Sacerdote for suggesting this approach.
25Particularly important are the percentage of households that are headed by females
(positively related to the prevalence to telephones) and the prevalence of poverty and of black
households (both of which are negatively related).
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2.  Specification checks
24
How credible is the causal interpretation of the positive coefficient on gun prevalence? 
One concern is that gun prevalence may be correlated with an omitted variable that is in fact an
important determinant of burglary.   The most familiar approach to dealing with this possibility is
to utilize instrumental variables, as we did in the previous section for the UCR data.  We did in
fact experiment with this approach for the NCVS data, and our results are reported in the next
section.  But first we present the results of a specification test in which other household-
experience variables which are unlikely to be influenced by gun prevalence are substituted for
burglary victimization in the regressions.  This test is motivated by the intuitive notion that if gun
prevalence is statistically associated with these other outcome variables, then there must be an
influential omitted variable in those regressions.   Such a finding would suggest that there may
also be an influential omitted variable in the burglary regressions.  
The choice of alternative outcome measures with which to conduct this “test” seems
fairly arbitrary.  Our intuition was that it would be most meaningful to look at other types of
crime victimization.  Among the possibilities included in the NCVS, the most attractive option
was motor-vehicle theft, a household crime (like burglary) that is almost always a crime of
stealth, for which household gun ownership would matter very little either as a deterrent or
enticement.  We also analyzed two quite different variables from the NCVS, namely whether
there was a telephone in the residence, and whether the respondent used public transportation.
Table 8 reports the results of re-running our basic set of regressions (from Table 6) for
these outcomes.  The first column repeats the estimated coefficients on gun prevalence for the
burglary regressions.  The second column gives the estimated coefficients when the same
regressions are run with motor-vehicle theft in place of burglary as the dependent variable.  The
coefficient estimates are reassuringly close to zero in all specifications.  “Telephone in residence”
(the third column) has a negative relationship to gun prevalence, but the estimated coefficient
shrinks to near zero when we introduce the county-level social and demographic co-variates.
25  
The final column of Table 8 reports the troubling results for the use of public
transportation.  The coefficient estimates are significantly negative in all specifications.  While it
is possible that gun prevalence does have a negative effect on use of public transportation, it
seems unlikely that this mechanism is what explains these strong results – more likely is omitted-
variable bias.  Perhaps, for example, the missing variable is trust and support for government. 
Prevalent distrust of government and a taste for self-reliance may lead to more guns and less
investment in public transit.  Whether that same omitted variable is also present in the burglary26One proxy for “trust in government” is voting Democratic in a presidential election.  We
computed the percentage of Clinton voters who chose either Clinton or Dole in the 1996
presidential election for each of the counties included in our sample.  When included in the
“public transportation” regression that variable proved to have a significant positive effect, but
with little effect on the coefficient on gun prevalence.  The same was true when we included this
co-variate in the burglary equation.  
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regressions is not clear; one test of these ideas proved inconclusive.
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3.  Results from Instrumental-Variable Regressions
Table 9 presents the results of two-stage least-squares regressions that rely on the same
instrument as in the UCR results, namely the percentage of the state population that lived in a
rural area in 1950.   This instrument performs very well in the first stage, and is positively related
to burglary in the second stage.  The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are very similar to
the magnitudes in the ordinary-least-squares analysis, but due to the inflated standard errors are
no longer discernibly different from zero in a statistical sense.
We also ran these regressions with the other outcome variables, as in Table 8, and with
very similar results.   Coefficient estimates for motor-vehicle theft and telephone are
insignificant, but the use of public transportation remains strongly negatively related to gun
prevalence.
D. Conclusions
Taken together, the results reported here provide suggestive evidence that increases in
gun ownership may lead to more burglaries.  Using a new geo-coded version of the NCVS we
estimate the elasticity of burglary-victimization probability with respect to our county-level gun
proxy to be +0.3 to +0.4, an estimate that is fairly robust to different specifications.  Panel-data
estimates from the UCR imply an elasticity of +0.6 to +0.7.  When we address the problem of
reverse causation by instrumenting for current gun ownership rates using across-state variation in
the proportion of the population living in rural areas in 1950 we obtain qualitatively similar
results.  While lagged urbanicity may well be correlated with unmeasured factors that affect
burglary rates, the direction of bias runs in the opposite direction of our findings (towards
overstating deterrence and understating inducement effects) and thus seems unlikely to explain
away our IV findings.  The causal mechanism by which higher gun prevalence would engender
higher burglary rates could be through the effect on the value of loot.
V. Guns and “Hot” Burglaries
The empirical results reported above are for residential burglary of all kinds.  But much of
the public discussion concerning the possible deterrent value of guns has focused on “hot”
burglaries of occupied dwellings.  In what follows we use a simple model to demonstrate that an-22-
increase in gun prevalence has an ambiguous effect on the rate of hot burglary.  Cross-section
NCVS regressions indicate that in practice local gun prevalence has little effect on the share of
burglaries that are hot.  
A. Model
The previous section developed a simple utility-maximizing model for burglars, which
highlighted the ambiguous effects of changes in gun prevalence on the overall burglary rate.  The
effect of guns on hot burglaries is highlighted by the aggregate burglary equation (6), in which G
(as before) is the proportion of households that keep guns, H[G] represents the rate of hot
burglaries, h[G] represents the proportion of burglaries that are hot, and B[G] represents the
overall burglary rate.
(6) H[G] = h[G]×B[G] 
(7) HN = hNB + hBN
In this setup an increase in gun ownership has an ambiguous net effect on the rate of hot
burglaries, as suggested by equation (7).  The sign of BN must be determined empirically, since
more guns may in theory lead to either more or fewer burglaries.  The empirical findings from
Section IV suggest that more guns increase the burglary rate, in which case the second term on
the right hand side of equation (7), BNh, is positive.  The sign of the first term on the right hand
side of (7) is negative (h’<0) if higher gun prevalence diverts burglars away from occupied
homes through a deterrent effect, and positive if the opportunity to steal a gun is worth enough so
that higher gun prevalence encourages burglars to take a greater chance.
Even if more guns in circulation causes burglars to take extra care to avoid occupied
homes, the effect on the parameter of greatest policy interest – the probability that an occupied
home is burgled – is ambiguous because of the increase in the total number of burglaries.  
B. NCVS Results
The results from a cross-sectional analysis of NCVS data from 1994-1998 are presented
in Table 10.  The first column of estimates are of the effect of gun prevalence on the likelihood
that someone is at home when there is a burglary (22 percent on average).  While the coefficient
estimates are negative in every case (suggesting a deterrent effect), they are not discernibly
different from zero, and in all but the simple regression have t-statistics less than one.  While null
findings may sometimes simply reflect a lack of statistical power, in this case the NCVS data
support a quite precise estimate, with the standard errors all less than one-tenth of one percentage
point. 
If, as suggested by these results, more guns lead to more burglaries but do not change the
proportion of burglaries that are hot, we would expect an increase in gun prevalence to be
associated with higher rates of hot burglary.  Consistent with this expectation, the estimates27We also repeated these OLS estimates for a sample restricted to a group that is
unusually susceptible to hot burglary rates, female-headed households.  The results are
qualitatively similar, although with larger standard errors.
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reported in the last column of Table 10 indicate that an increase in gun prevalence increases the
probability that a household is victimized by a hot burglary.  A 10 percentage-point  increase in
the gun proxy increases the rate of hot burglaries by .03 or .04 percent, roughly in proportion to
the increase in the overall burglary rate.
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VI. Discussion
Our paper is motivated by the plausible although untested claim that widespread gun
ownership deters burglars and diverts them from occupied homes.  Previous evidence on this
point is indirect, anecdotal, or based on flawed data, and in any case provides no clear
conclusion.
The new results reported here suggest that if there is such a deterrent effect, it may well
be swamped by other factors associated with gun prevalence – most likely, it seems to us, the fact
that guns are particularly attractive loot.  Cross-section analysis of the NCVS and panel-data
analysis of the UCR yield quite similar findings: a 10 percent increase in our measure of gun
ownership increases burglary rates by 3 to 7 percent.  These results are not likely to be due to
reverse causation:  Among other evidence on this matter is the findings from our instrumental-
variable estimates, which are consistent with the OLS results. Most important, we find that gun
prevalence has little effect on the fraction of residential burglaries in which someone is at home,
and that the hot-burglary victimization rate tends to increase with gun prevalence.  These results
are robust to alternative specifications and data sets.
We conclude that keeping a gun at home is unlikely to provide a positive externality in
the form of burglary deterrence.  If anything, residences in a neighborhood with high gun
prevalence are at greater risk of being burglarized, both hot and otherwise.  There is an irony
here: guns are often kept to protect the home, but the aggregate effect of individual decisions to
keep guns at home appears to be an increase in the victimization rate.
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Table 1
International Comparisons of Hot Burglary Rates
Source Country Year Hot burglary rate



























Residents’ location at time of 
   burglary unspecified or unknown 
Home Office (1999)
Resident at home
    Aware of burglary
    Unaware of burglary
Adjusted UK “hot” burglary rate
    Upper bound














NOTES: a = Cited in Kleck (1997). b = Cited in Kopel (2001). c = Figures taken from BJS
(1996, p. 70) reports for victim’s activity at time of burglary; 24.5% of respondents report that
they were sleeping or engaging in some other activity at home at the time of the burglary.  Our
high end estimate comes from including the 3.9% of respondents who say at the time of the
burglary they were engaged in some other activity (unspecified whether this was at home or
elsewhere) and the 16.2% did not know what they were doing at the time of the burglary.-30-
Table 2
Socio-economic and other differences between US and UK, 1998
United States United Kingdom
Avg punishment for burglars, 1996*
Convictions per 1,000 burglary arrests
Probability of custody given conviction







% households headed by single female 29%
1 22%
2
% people living in free-standing single-
family homes
63%
7  23% (living in detached
house)
2
% people living in mobile homes/trailers 6.6%
7  no indication of mobile
homes/trailers present
in UK
% people who own their own home 66%
6  69%
2
% households that contain male between
20 and 60
median income $38,233 (1997-1998
two-year average)
3






% population non-white 17%
1 7%
2




% people living in urban areas 80% (as of 1996)
1
% households that own dogs** 40% 20%
Data Sources:  
1 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999.  
2 Living in Britain 1998:
General Household Survey.  
3 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 1997, 1998, and 1999.
 
4 Criminal Statistics, England and Wales, 1997 (The Stationery Office) and findings from the British Crime Survey 
5
Criminal Sentencing Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 1998
6 U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Survey, Third Quarter 2001 
7 U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing
Survey for the United States: 1999 * UK figure is for England and Wales, provided courtesy of David Farrington. 
Figure for probability of custody given conviction for England and Wales for 1997. ** Figure for UK is for 2000
from Claritas Precision Marketing Solutions (www.claritas-europe.com).  Figure for US is taken from the American
Pet Products Manufacturers Association 2001-2002 National Pet Owners Survey (summary statistics downloaded
from www.hsus.org/programs/companion/overpopulation/petowner_stats.html).-31-
Table 3
Ranking of States by Gun-Prevalence Proxy








































































































Effects of Gun Prevalence on Burglary Rates
Repeated 36-Month Cross-Sections
UCR State-Level Data, 1977-1998
Coefficients and Standard Errors
Dependent variable:
) UCR burglary rate
) log UCR burglary
rate
Coefficient on lagged ) gun-prevalence
variable in specified model:
Base model*
Use ) log gun prevalence in base model
Condition on lagged dep variable in base model
Add linear state-specific trends in base model
Add region / year interactions to base model


































NOTES: * = Base model also includes state and year fixed effects, as well as controls for state
unemployment rate, median per capita income, alcohol consumption per capita, percent poor, and
percent black.   State population used as weights; robust standard errors in parentheses.  The
correction for serial correlation allows the inter-temporal correlation in the error structure to be
state-specific.** = County level model controls for county and year fixed effects, per capita
income and unemployment rate.  Data available only through 1995. b = Statistically significant at
5 percent level, c  = Statistically significant at 10 percent level.-33-
Table 5
Instrumental Variables Analysis of Effect of Guns on Burglary
UCR State- and County-Level Data
Point Estimates and Standard Errors
STATE LEVEL DATA
First stage results
Effects of % rural, 1950 on % suicides w/ guns, 87-96 (beta, se)
F-statistic on instrument (df)
Partial R-squared on instrument
Second stage results










Effects of % rural, 1950 on % suicides w/ guns, 87-96 (beta, se)
F-statistic on instrument (df)
Partial R-squared on instrument
Second stage results








NOTES: Regression model for state-level estimates include co-variates for state age and race
distribution, region, prisoners per capita, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and percent living in
metropolitan areas.  Regression model for county-level data controls for region, county per capita
income, and unemployment rate.  All regressions estimated using state (county) population as
weights.  b = Statistically significant at 5 percent level.-34-
Table 6
Determinants of Burglary-Victimization Probability
Cross-Section OLS Regression Results
NCVS Data, 1994-1998
Coefficients and Standard Errors (x100)
Dependent Variable = burglary in previous 6 months
Explanatory Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3










1. Type of Building
                  a. 1 Unit ---- ---- ----




























         2. Location
                  a. Urban area ---- ---- ----





































         3. Children under 12
                 a. None ---- ---- ----


















        4. Children over 12
              a. None or 1  ---- ---- ----


















        5. Time at address
            a. More than 2 years ---- ---- ----


















D. Characteristics of                 
      household head
           1. Race
                       a. White ----  ---- ----


















           2. Age
                       a. Under 25 ---- ---- ----













































       3. Marital status-36-
               a. Married ---- ---- ----








































      4. Education
           a. High school dropout ---- ---- ----





























      5. Work status


















      6. Away from Home 
         During Evenings















         c. Less than once a week ---- ---- ----









      1. Percent Black -.0046
(.0083)
      2. Percent Hispanic .0057
(.0044)
      3. Percent in Poverty .0146
(.0173)
      4. Female Labor Force        
         Participation Percent
.0167
(.0241)
      5. Density (1,000 persons   













Note: All regression specifications also included dummy variables for household income levels.
Model 3 also included state fixed effects. 
a = Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, b = Statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, c = Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.-38-
Table 7
Effects of Gun Prevalence on Probability of Gun Theft in Burglary
Cross-Section OLS Regression Results
NCVS Data, 1994-1998
Coefficients and Standard Errors


















3. Household characteristics and  







4. Household characteristics and  







Note: Each entry is the estimated coefficient and standard error on the gun-prevalence proxy
from a regression with specification and data as indicated.
a = Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, b = Statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, c = Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.-39-
Table 8
Specification Tests for Burglary Regressions
Cross-Section OLS Regression Results
NCVS Data, 1994-98



























































Note: Each entry is the estimated coefficient and standard error on the gun-prevalence proxy
from a regression with specification as indicated.
a = Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, b = Statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, c = Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.-40-
Table 9
Effects of Gun Prevalence on Probability of Burglary
Two-State Least Squares Regression Results
NCVS Data, 1996-98
Coefficients and Standard Errors
Co-variates in Specification 
First Stage 
(IV on Gun Prevalence)
Second Stage



















Note: Entries in the “First Stage” column are the estimated coefficients and asymptotic standard
errors of the instrumental variable (% rural in the state in 1950). Entries in the “Second Stage”
are the estimated coefficients and asymptotic standard errors for gun prevalence proxy on the
probability of burglary. N=192,286.
a = Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, b = Statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, c = Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.-41-
Table 10
Effects of Gun Prevalence on Probability of “Hot” Burglary
Cross-Section OLS Regression Results
NCVS Data, 1994-1998
Coefficients and Standard Errors































Note: Each entry is the estimated coefficient and standard error on the gun-prevalence proxy
from a regression with specification and data as indicated.
a = Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, b = Statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, c = Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.-42-
Table A1
Effects of Gun Prevalence on Burglary Rates
Regression Results from Repeated 36-Month Cross-Sections
UCR State-Level Data, 1977-1998
Complete List of Coefficients and Standard Errors
Outcome measure:
)Burgit )log Burgit )log Burgit



















)  Per capita income 14.9466 -0.0239 -0.0089
($1,000's) (15.2464)             (0.0150) (0.0142)





) Alcohol consumption 15.8253 0.0318 0.0700
per capita (106.6787) (0.0614) (0.0705)
) % poor 18.5883 0.0102 0.0103
(11.7789) (0.0070) (0.0070)
) % black 1.6348 0.0017 0.0025
(2.9934) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
included in model?
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
included in model?
N 253 253 202
R-squared 0.5863 0.6135 0.7102
NOTES:  Missing values for co-variates are set to zero with missing-data dummies included as
additional controls (not shown).  State population used as weights; robust standard errors
presented in parentheses.  b = Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, c = Statistically




Explanatory Variable  Type Definition Mean Standard
Deviation





1. Type of Building




                  b. 2-4 units D Structure has 2-4
housing units
.113 .317
                  c. 5 or more units D Structure has 5+
housing units
.206 .404
                  d. Mobile home D Structure is mobile
home
.027 .163
                  e. Other type D Structure is of
other type
.014 .116
         2. Location




                  b. Suburban area D Household is in
MSA, but not in
central city 
.593 .491




         1. Male head D Reference person
is male
.597 .491
         2. Renter occupied D Reference person
rents home
.363 .481-44-
         3. Children
            a. None under 12 D No children under
12 in household
---- ----
            b. 1 under 12 D 1 child under 12 in
household
.134 .340
            c. 2 or more under 12 D 2 or more children
under 12 in HH
.136 .343
           d. None or 1 12 or older D 1 or no children
over 12 in HH
---- ----
           e. 2 12 or older D 2 children 12 or
older in HH
.469 .499
           f. 3 or more 12 or older D 3 or more children
12 or older in HH
.234 .423
        4. Time at address
           a. More than 2 years D Have lived at
current address
more than 2 years
---- ----








D. Characteristics of household
head
           1. Race












           2. Age-45-
                       a. Under 25 D Reference person
under age 25
---- ----
                       b. 25-34 D Reference person
age 25-34
.195 .396
                       c. 35-44 D Reference person
age 35-44
.232 .422
                       d. 45-54 D Reference person
age 55-54
.189 .391
                       e. 55-64 D Reference person
age 55-64
.121 .327
                      f. 65 or older D Reference person
age 65 or older
.206 .404
       3. Marital status
               a. Married D Reference person
married
---- ----
               b. Divorced D Reference person
divorced
.113 .317
               c. Separated D Reference person
separated
.027 .163
               d. Widowed D Reference person
widowed
.099 .298
               e. Never married D Reference person
never married
.136 .342




      4. Education












          d. College graduate D Reference person a
college graduate
.285 .452




      5. Work status









      6. Away from Home 
         During Evenings





          b. Once a week D Reference person
away from home
one night a week?
.453 .498
         c. Less than once a week D Reference person
away from home
under one night a
week?
---- ----






      1. Percent Black C Percent black in
county, 1990
12.39 11.93
      2. Percent Hispanic C Percent Hispanic in
county, 1990
10.11 13.08
      3. Percent in Poverty C Percent in poverty
in county, 1990
11.38 5.03-47-
      4. Female Labor Force             
          Participation Percent



























     4. Phone D Does household
have a phone?
.963 .190













Notes: Reference person is NCVS term for head of household. 
Variable types D-Dummy (0,1), C-Continuous. N=329,102-48-
APPENDIX B
Assessing the Likely Direction of Error in the IV Estimates
In this appendix we outline the argument for why any bias in our instrumental variables (IV)
estimates introduced by correlation between our instrument and the unobserved determinants of
burglary rates is likely to lead us to overstate deterrence and understate inducement effects.
In equations (B1) and (B2) we reproduce the first and second stage equations that we use
to derive our IV estimates for the state-level UCR data.  Burgi represents state (i)’s burglary rate,
Gi is the gun-prevalence proxy, ei is a stochastic error term and Ri represents the proportion of the
state that lived in rural areas in 1950.  We use two-stage least squares to estimate a predicted
value of the gun index in the first-stage equation (B1) as a function of the instrumental variable,
the proportion of the state living in rural areas in 1950; the predicted value for the gun index
from this first-stage equation is then substituted for the actual value in the second stage equation
(B2).  Note that the actual equations that we estimate also include a common set of exogenous
control variables Xi and intercept terms.  Because the inclusion of co-variates does not change
the analysis (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995), we exclude co-variates from the equations to
simplify the discussion.  We also note that the county-level UCR analysis and household-level
NCVS estimates are calculated using the same set of equations, with Ri measured at the state
level, Gi measured at the county level and the second-stage standard errors adjusted accordingly.
(B1) Gi = " Ri + vi
(B2) Burgi = 2 Gi + ei 
Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) show that in this set-up the bias of the instrumental
variables estimate for 2 is given by equation (B3), where F
2
G represents the variance of the gun
index variable and F',e represents the covariance between the predicted value of the gun index
from the first stage equation, ', and the second stage error term, e.
(B3) plim 2IV - 2 = F',e / F
2
G
Our argument that this bias is likely to overstate the deterrent effect of guns on burglaries
stems from the fact that areas that were more rural in 1950 have higher gun ownership rates
(">0), as shown in Table 5, and that areas that are currently more rural have if anything lower
burglary rates than urban communities.  This second observation comes from cross-section
analysis of the NCVS, which suggests that households outside of metropolitan statistical areas
(MSA’s) clearly have lower burglary rates than other respondents even after conditioning on the
rich set of household characteristics described in the text.  We similarly find in the UCR that
states in which a larger proportion of residents currently live in MSA’s have relatively higher
burglary rates.  These findings suggest that the covariance between the instrument and the
second-stage error term, FR,e,  is negative.  If ">0 and FR,e<0 then F',e<0 and, because F
2
G>0, the
IV estimate will be biased in the direction of overstating the deterrent effect from guns.